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Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court
Julian Greenspun *
Recognition of the right to counsel involves no necessary inter-
ference with the special purposes of juvenile court procedures;
indeed it seems that counsel can play an important role in the
process of rehabilitation.'
A PROMINENT ATTORNEY in Cleveland recently remarked to me that
he considered the Juvenile Court to be a mystery, which his firm
tried to avoid as much as possible. The implication was that attorneys
do not know what to expect once they enter this courtroom. This
enigma has plagued many attorneys in the past; however, it is hoped
that the Gault2 decision will clarify the role of the lawyer in the Ju-
venile Court. Legislation on this problem is before the Ohio Legislature
(for example) at the time of this writing (June, 1969).
Involvement with the Juvenile Court generally begins with a phone
call from an hysterical parent who has had a petition filed against his
youngster.3 The first appointment with the parents will generally indi-
cate that they are primarily concerned with getting their child out of
the "mess" with as little embarrassment to themselves as possible.
Sometimes, they are even concerned about their child's welfare. This
gives rise to the attorney's greatest conflict; is it to be the child's or
the parent's interest which he shall be representing? Needless to say,
the attorney must be motivated by ethics and an intrinsic ingredient,
often defined as conscience, to do what is best for the child.
Admittedly, this is easier said than done, particularly where an
investigation reveals that the youngster's delinquent behavior is a result
of his environment. The parents feel that the attorney was not retained
to point out environmental shortcomings, but to "get the kid off the
hook." Since it is the interest of the child which must be of primary
concern, the attorney is called upon to use tactful dialogue in con-
veying the situation to the parents.
However, many attorneys remain motivated by the parents' in-
terests. This point brings to mind David. David had a nasty habit of
maliciously destroying the property of others. His parents' attorney
made an investigation into the home situation and summarily concluded
that the parents were wonderful individuals (particularly since they
* B.S., Ohio State Univ.; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State Univ.; Probation Officer, Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court.
1 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, at 38 (1967); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juve-
nile Courts, 67 Col. L. Rev. 281 (1967), 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 at 552, n. 64 (1967).
2 In Re Gault, supra note 1.
8 Levin, Role of the Lawyer in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 32 Penn. B. A. Q. 427
(1968).
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were paying the fee) and that they were entirely incapable of neg-
lecting David. He convinced the judge of the merits of the parents
with such persuasive appeal that David was placed on probation in
spite of a psychiatric recommendation to the contrary. Three weeks
later David was picked up for carving intricate designs in crane tires
with his switch-blade-knife.
In addition to being an advocate and a defender of constitutional
and legal rights, counsel has an obligation at the first interview to ex-
plain the purpose and objectives of the Juvenile Court.4 It is amazing
to discover that so little is known about the Court by so many. One
mother, whose son was charged with a traffic violation, asked me during
the investigation if he might be sent to the Ohio State Reformatory!
After the investigation is completed (aids in investigation are ex-
plained infra), the advocate is prepared to enter the clandestine citadel,
now armed with the guarantees imposed by Gault.5
Juveniles, prior to Gault, were sheltered from the procedures and
dispositions received by adult criminal offenders,6 under the assump-
tion that the juvenile court was to act as a protective parent rather than
a punitive authority.
In addition to the advantageous treatment received by juveniles
prior to Gault,7 this decision gave them the further protection of many
of the important due process requirements of a criminal proceeding. The
principal rulings of Gault may be summarized as follows: (1) the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment applies to delinquency hearings
which may result in confinement; (2) notice must be given in advance
of the court proceedings and must set forth the alleged misconduct;
(3) the child and his parents must be informed of the right to an at-
torney and if unable to afford one, the Court must show a willingness
to appoint counsel to represent the child; (4) the privilege against
self-incrimination applies and juveniles must be adequately appraised of
their right to remain silent; and (5) absent an adequate and valid con-
fession, confrontation and sworn testimony by witnesses available for
cross-examination are essential. These elements apply solely to the
hearing and not to prejudicial stages of the hearing."
The elements are clearly set out, but the attorney still faces the
dilemma of applying them to his particular case. Most of the elements
are flexible in that some courts strictly adhere to them,9 while others
4 Isaacs, Lawyer in Juvenile Court, 10 Crim. L.Q. 222 (1968).
5 In Re Gault, supra note 1.
6 In Re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954); U.S. v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214
(N.D. Ala. 1957); State v. Couch, 294 S.W. 2d 636 (Mo. App. 1956).
7 In Re Gault, supra note 1.
s Ibid.
9 People v. Sykes, 22 N.Y. 2d 159, 239 N.E. 2d 182 (1968).
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interpret them liberally. 10 However, certain rules have developed from
Gault which are consistently followed in Ohio and many Juvenile
Courts in other states.
In most poignant terms the Supreme Court points out that the
notice must set forth the particulars of the alleged misconduct." This
is of vital importance to the attorney since it allows him to prepare a
defense, that is, to disprove the allegations of the petition. Although
some courts, prior to Gault, held that the mere allegation of "de-
linquency" was sufficient,12 it is inevitable that such flimsy, all in-
clusive allegations will not suffice in the future. However, inconsequen-
tial errors in the petition do not give attorneys a carte blanche to move
for a dismissal or continuance if such errors may be easily rectified
during or prior to the hearing. To resort to technicalities which do not
hamper due process would be a wrongful injection of criminal adversary
proceedings into the Juvenile Court.
In the Courtroom
The primary significance of Gault is to insure the juvenile due
process. However, this does not imply that the adversary system of the
criminal court should be injected into juvenile court proceedings, thus
turning the proceedings into a trial. Instead, the stress is upon safe-
guarding the youngster's right to due process while maintaining the at-
mosphere of a fair hearing. Thus, formality is avoided wherever pos-
sible and the informality of the proceedings has been frequently up-
held by appellate courts on the basis that Juvenile Courts are non-
criminal in nature.' 3 As the Gault decision points out the hearing need
not conform with all the requirements of a criminal proceeding but must
measure up to the essentials of due process. 14
The importance of maintaining a non-adversary procedure cannot
be overstressed, 15 for an adversary system sets the stage for the en-
trance of the prosecutor's office and the Juvenile Court will inevitably
become a criminal court. Remember, that the prosecutor's office is
geared toward punitive measurements and the protection of society with
10 Sult v. Weber, 210 So. 2d 739 (Fla. App. 1968).
11 In Re Gault, supra note 1, at 31.
12 In re L - ,--- 25 Ohio Op. 2d 369, 194 N.E. 2d 797 (1963); In Re Duncan, 62
Ohio L. Abs. 173, 107 N.E. 2d 256 (1951).
13 Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E. 2d 457 (1964); Murphy v. City of
New York, 273 App. Div. 492, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (1948); In re DiMaggio, 65 N.Y.S. 2d
613 (N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1946); Cox v. Wood, 152 Tex. 283, 256 S.W. 2d 841 (1953).
14 In Re Gault, supra note 1, at 27-29.
15 Cope v. Campbell, supra note 13; In the Interest of Lindh, 11 Utah 2d 385, 359 P.
2d 1058 (1961).
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
18 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3)
little thought of the child's welfare. This would produce not only an
increase in commitments, but commitments to improper institutions.1 6
Attorney As an Advocate and Other Miscellaneous Vocations
First and foremost the attorney is an advocate, a protector of con-
stitutional rights. Gault undeniably thrusts this role into the Juvenile
Court setting. But because of the nature of the Court, the attorney
must not only be an advocate, but a quasi sociologist-psychologist. A
dual role is assumed because he must not only protect the rights of the
juvenile but must also consider his welfare. Frankly, "winning" the
case is of secondary importance unless the juvenile is clearly innocent
of the charge. Of equal, if not of primary concern, is the child's wel-
fare. It has been observed on occasion that lawyers, after delinquency
has been established by much more than a preponderance of evidence,
revert and regress to irrelevant technicalities which have little bearing
on due process. Victory is interpreted in terms of personal gain and
the child's welfare is smothered by the cloak of adherence to rigorous
procedure.17
If the attorney succeeds in getting the petition dismissed when the
child is actually guilty, the child may come to believe that as long as he
has a "mouthpiece" he can continue his pattern of delinquent behavior
with impunity.'8
Privilege Against Self Incrimination
Gault held that a Juvenile Court judge must inform the parent
and the child of their right to remain silent. 19 This appears to be an
extension of Miranda20 to the Juvenile Court.
Although a 1966 California decision rejected Miranda as pertaining
to Juvenile Courts on the reasoning that a juvenile court procedure was
16 Whitlatch, The Gault Decision-Its Effect on the Office of the Prosecuting Attor-
ney, 41 Ohio Bar 41 (1968).
17 Dr. Charles McKay of the Department of Sociology of Case-Western Reserve
University related a unique but most poignant approach about the adherence of the
adversary system to the letter of the law. His notion is in terms of, "How does the
child perceive the situation." He doubts that the child would ever perceive it as
one in which people are trying to help him, in the full fledged adversary proceeding,
and that the child feels like a pawn, surrounded by formalities which he does not
understand. Dr. McKay went on to say, "The main reason why he's (the child)
there becomes lost as far as he's concerned. It's no longer a question of what he did
but the emphasis shifts to the outcome which will be immediately most advan-
tageous to him. This, of course, is getting him off the hook." Dr. McKay said that
the parents are often guilty of this same error. That is, the parents and the attor-
ney are not concerned with remedies, but the emphasis shifts to the specific act and
what they're going to do with the child in terms of that act. The future of the
child is forgotten. (Personal interview, April, 1969.)
18 Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 A.B.A.J. 1206 (Nov. 1960).
19 In re Gault, supra note 1, at 47.
20 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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not a criminal trial 21 this was overruled by Gault which specifically
stated that the privilege against self incrimination is applicable to ju-
veniles as well as adults.2 2 However, this is not a right which should be
abused by counsel. In cases where a child admits guilt to an attorney,
but the attorney is fortified by the child's right to remain silent, he can
obtain dismissal, and on issues not connected with guilt or innocence.
This would encourage lawyers to advise their clients to remain silent
and would necessitate a prosecutor, the result of which would be an
adversary proceeding instead of a hearing.
The paramount purpose of maintaining a non-adversary proceeding
is to elicit the truth, for it is only the truth which will benefit the child.
For this reason counsel should permit his client to respond to the Judge
concerning issues which are pertinent to the case. Too often an at-
torney may take advantage of the empty chair on the other side of
the table, by advising his client before the hearing, to remain silent.
The attorney has a responsibility to adduce for the Court all facts
and evidence which he has obtained. Such full disclosure will greatly
eliminate the judge acting as prosecutor who would look disfavorably on
hidden facts and conflicting testimony elicited by him at the hearing.
23
Evidence-Hearsay
Gault does not expressly prohibit the admissibility of hearsay in at-
taining fairness for the child at the hearing. 24 Generally, Courts have
varied on the admissibility of hearsay. Some courts have acceded to
the admission of most testimony.2 5 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has held that a Juvenile Court may avoid the legalities of rules of evi-
dence which are applicable to other hearings. 26 In Ohio, the hearsay
21 In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1966).
22 In re Gault, supra note 1, at 55. For an early application of this principle laid
down in the Gault decision see, Ex parte De Grace, 425 S.W. 2d 228 (Mo. App. 1968).
23 Whitlatch, The Juvenile Court-A Court of Law, 18 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 1239 (1967).
24 In Re Gault, supra n. 1.
25 In Re Rich, 125 Vt. 375, 216 A. 2d 266 (1966). Likewise, the New York Family
Court Act, Sec. 745, provides for the admission of all evidence, material and relevant,
during the dispositional hearing, providing that the adjudication be based on a pre-
ponderance of evidence. Thus an open door is left for the admission of appropriate
hearsay evidence, which seems to be the more generally accepted rule. References
to this act may be found in the New York Standard Civil Practice Service, volume 24(1964).
Compare, however, with a Nebraska decision which held that "Reports of an
ex parte investigation made by investigators from the police and child welfare de-
partments are not competent evidence in a proceeding to have a minor child de-
clared a delinquent, and may not be considered by the court in the hearing and
decision of a disputed issue." In re Barkus, 168 Neb. 257, 95 N.W. 2d 674 (1959).
26 In re Holmes, supra note 6.
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rule is frequently relaxed in administrative hearings, 27 but a judge may
strike certain hearsay testimony.28
In considering Gault, therefore, the reasonable conclusion would be
that hearsay is generally admissible provided that it does not hamper
due process, and is material and relevant to the issues. For example, it
is quite obvious that neighbors or teachers should not be permitted to
testify as to the number of times they saw Johnny flatten tires or throw
paperclips in the classroom and whose primary interest is in getting
Johnny "out of their hair."
Evidence in General
The rules of evidence which are generally applied to Juvenile Court
are those shown by long experience as essential to getting at the truth
with reasonable certainty.29
A bone of contention is whether the exclusionary rule prohibiting
the admission of evidence illegally seized should be extended to Juvenile
Courts. On a parallel with this is whether the requirement of Miranda
v. Arizona30 should apply to police interrogation of juveniles. Prior to
Gault a few courts applied the Miranda case to juveniles.3 1
Technically, Gault does not apply to either of these situations since
the Court states that it is not concerned with procedural or constitutional
rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process; al-
though the court does mention that the police should inform children
of their privilege against self incrimination.3 2
For those who believe that Gault should or will result in an ex-
tension of the exclusionary rule to Juvenile Courts the question is, as
to juveniles, what is illegally obtained? As to adults evidence is ad-
missible if the obtaining was incidental to a lawful arrest.s s A lawful
arrest exists when the police officer observed the adult committing a
misdemeanor or has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has
committed or is committing a felony.3 4 However, where juveniles are
concerned, a police officer may take the child into protective custody
where he has legal grounds to believe that the child is delinquent and
27 1 Ohio Jur. 2d, Administrative Law and Procedure 102 (1953).
28 State v. Shardell, 107 Ohio App. 338, 153 N.E. 2d 510 (1958); where the trial
judge struck all hearsay evidence presented by the police officer, who obtained the
prejudicial information from other boys not in the presence of the defendant.
29 People v. Lewis, 235 App. Div. 559, 257 N.Y.S. 457 (1932); U.S. v. Borders, supra
note 6; New York Family Court Act secs. 724, 734, 735.
30 Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 20; holding that the privilege against self incrimi-
nation extends to police interrogation and that confessions illegally obtained are in-
admissible as evidence.
31 In re Ronney, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S. 2d 844 (1963); Urbasek v. People, 76 Ill.
App. 2d 375, 222 N.E. 2d 233 (1966).
32 In re Gault, supra note 1, at 55.
33 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, at 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, at 1691 (1961).
34 Smith v. New Jersey, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A. 2d 761, cert. denied 374 U.S. 835, 83 S. Ct.
1879 (1963).
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it is not necessary that the child be committing a misdemeanor in the
officer's presence or that cause exists for the officer to believe that the
child has been involved in the commission of a felony.35 The grounds
for believing a child to be a delinquent are infinite and include such
things as violation of curfew, failure to obey parents, and missing ap-
pointments with probation officers. 36 Since taking a child into custody
is tantamount to a lawful arrest, but with a much wider range of per-
missibility for such action, it appears as though the exclusionary rule
will be infrequently resorted to in Juvenile Court proceedings.3 7
Quantum of Proof
To expand upon the degree of proof required, one must go from
the part to the whole; that is from specific allegations in the petition to
a finding of delinquency.
Where a petition makes specific allegations, the truth of the allega-
tions must be established by a preponderance of evidence.38 Thus,
where an officer alleged that a minor assaulted him and the evidence
elicited was that when the minor tried to escape from the police cruiser
the officer hit his chin on the door, the court held that there was not a
preponderance of evidence sufficient to sustain an allegation of as-
sault.
3 9
35 In re L - , supra note 12; New York has taken a more stringent approach
regarding the taking of a child into custody. Under its New York Family Court Act,
a police officer (Sec. 721), or a private person (Sec. 721), may take a child into
custody only if he has done an act that in the case of an adult would constitute a
crime. All other detention must be ordered by a family court, either through a
summons (SEcs. 736, 737), or under a warrant if the summons is ignored or is in-
effective under the circumstances (Secs. 725, 738).
36 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2151.02; Many states have been gravitating away from
frivolous ground for arresting adults. In New York prior to 1967, under vagrancy
legislation, one could be "picked up" if he did not have a visible means of maintain-
ing himself. Such legislation has been held unconstitutional in that it was a misuse
of police power. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y. 2d 309, 229 N.E. 2d 426 (1967).
Las Vegas (of all places) had a city ordinance which prohibited persons of
"evil reputation" from meeting one another. In Parker v. Las Vegas Municipal
Judge, 83 Nev. , 427 P. 2d 642 (1967), the ordinance was held unconstitutional,
because it punished status rather than act plus intent. Perhaps as a result of such
decisions, affecting adults, and in the shadow of Gault, such vague and indefinite
Juvenile Delinquency legislation will no longer be acceptable.
37 Although one might contend that the Exclusionary Rule of Mapp will seep into
Juvenile Court proceedings, since the Miranda requirements have been invoked on
occasion, several New York decisions have in fact, held that evidence unlawfully
obtained is to be excluded in a delinquency proceeding, Matter of Williams, 49 Misc.
2d 900, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 987 (1965).
Thomas Whalen, a Cleveland attorney, who was a detective for the Cleveland
Police Department for 25 years, litigates cases for delinquent Negroes on a no-fee
basis. He states that the reason for his benevolence is that he is "bearing the cross"
for so many years of physical abuse administered to the children once they were
inside the paddy wagon. If these high handed police tactics still exist (and it is
believed by many that they do) the doctrines of Miranda and Mapp should be
ubiquitously applied in the court.
38 In re L --------- , supra note 12.
39 Ibid.
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Moving on to the whole, a delinquency proceeding is not criminal
in nature and a mere preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to war-
rant a finding of delinquency, even though such determination involves
a violation of a state criminal statute. This attitude is assumed by most
states but exceptions can be found.40 An Illinois court held that where
the findings of delinquency for misconduct, which would be criminal if
charged as an adult, is valid only when the acts of delinquency are
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.4 1 A New York court found that
where a child is charged with arson, to be adjudged delinquent, he must
be proven guilty beyond the reasonable doubt.42
Disposition
Many attorneys feel that their duty ends upon adjudication. How-
ever, due to the nature of the juvenile court (that of providing for the
welfare of the child), counsel must be prepared to represent his client
in the dispositional phase of the hearing.43 Perhaps this phase has cast
the greatest but most rewarding responsibility upon the attorney; it
requires him to be a quasi sociologist-psychologist* and therefore a
knowledge of the behavioral sciences and community facilities is a must.
A lawyer has many tools with which to work in this area, but by
far the most important is the social investigation prepared by the court
staff of probation officers, psychiatrists and psychologists. These people
have the training and devoted most of their time gathering informa-
tion, including financial resources, personality evaluations of the child,
and psycho-dynamic interrelationships of the family.
4 4
Attorneys frequently assume they have an innate God-given power
of determining what really makes the child "tick." On one occasion,
40 In re Bigsby, 202 A. 2d 785 (D.C. App. 1964); Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Ill. App. 2d
439, 174 N.E. 2d 716 (1967); a recent Ohio decision, however, held that a juvenile
court judge may, in his discretion, deny a request for a jury trial and decide the
case on a preponderance of evidence, In re Benn, 18 Ohio App. 2d 97, 247 N.E. 2d 335(1969).
41 In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E. 2d 716 (1967).
42 In re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (1931).
43 David Matza, professor of Criminology at University of California, Berkeley,
points out that the correctional institution "label" stamps a boy with an indelible
mark that others tend to judge him by. if a young adult says that "I stole a few
cars when I was a kid," he is looked upon as only being a mischevious kid in his
younger days. But, "I stole some cars when I was a kid and was at the reform
school," means that not only was he mischevious but also he was in reform school.
This puts him in a different perspective in other's minds, as well as his own, in that
he is no "damn good," because the state has told him so.
In addition, Professor Matza further suggests that the child in Juvenile Court
or in reform school quickly becomes aware that there are others who did the same
thing he did and are out on the street. Of course, he feels that he got a "bum rap"
and is impregnated with bitterness. Matza, Delinquency and Drift, at 101-104
(Wiley, 1964).
44 Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga County (Ohio) Probation Officers' Manual, at 101
et seq. (1961).
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after reading the social investigation, an elderly attorney slammed it
down on my desk and mumbled "nonsense." He began ranting about
the time he was in a barber shop in 1939, and accused Mussolini of
being a "bum," which almost resulted in his throat being slit. "From that
time," he said, "I have never made an error in character judgment."
The Ohio Revised Code has been amended to permit council to in-
spect the probation officer's and social worker's records used in the
bearing.45 The basic argument against this amendment was that such
a disclosure would destroy the confidential relationship of the court
worker and the client and would be disruptive of family relationships. 46
Rarely has this presumption been verified. However, on one occasion
an attorney read in the psychiatric report that the child had been acting
out as a result of an intolerable and insecure home situation. Counsel
relayed this information to the mother, who in spite of her shortcomings,
loved her child. The result was the destruction of any possibility the
probation officer had of working with the boy and his family.
It is not enough to know what the record says, but one must under-
stand what the record means. The attorney may ask the probation of-
ficer or the psychiatrist for explanations.
Once the attorney understands the child's psychological composition,
and the community or state facilities available for treatment, he is in
an excellent position to suggest to the court the type of treatment which
would be best for the child. Most juvenile courts have a Division of
Placement whose purpose is to determine the suitability of a child for
a particular institution and to attempt to procure a placement at that
institution. Consulting with the placement department will give the at-
torney a working knowledge of the various institutions and their re-
quirements for admissibility.47
45 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec.. 2151.35 (1966).
46 Whitlatch, supra note 23. Dr. Charles McGhay of the Department of Sociology of
Case-Western Reserve University elucidated on the necessity of accessibility of
family records to attorneys. His well taken point is that many times a judge will
make decisions based on the boy's previous record. If this is the case the attorney
should have some information available to him, since the lawyer is representing the
interests of the child, while the judge represents the interests of the child and the
community. He further commented that if the lawyer maintains professional ethics
there should be no disruption of family relationships, allowing of course, a margin
of error for "downright ignorance." (Personal interview, April, 1969.)
47 The Placement Department of the Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga County places
children in private institutions across the country (as well as state schools in Ohio).
In terms of cost of care, the least expensive is the famous Father Flanagan's Boys-
town. The county pays one dollar per day (a pittance), for boys which it places
there. Devereux Schools, located in six states, charges approximately $1000 per
month for a child under its care. Generally, the parents of the child pay the bulk of
the fee. Devereux facilities include an overall staff-student ratio of approximately one
to one in their environmental therapy program, and a full time medical, psychological,
psychiatric staff. There are myriad schools falling between Boystown and Devereux
in terms of costs. Of course, the child's placement does not turn on cost of care, but
(Continued on next page)
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Of course, placement in an institution is not always the right an-
swer. For example, if the child's acting out is a result of an excess of
idle time and a feeling of poor self-worth, perhaps the Job Corps or
the Military might be the solution. There are many other possible
recommendations such as foster homecare, social service counselling
and probation, to name a few.
4 s
Admittedly, the probation report often determines the disposition.
It is not inconceivable that the report may be biased by the probation
officers prejudices or idiosyncracies. A lawyer can insure that the dis-
position is based on complete and accurate facts.
Counsel may also give the child and his family a voice in the pro-
ceeding by acting as their spokesman.' As in, one hearing, where the
parents told their attorney of their desire to have their son at home
and their willingness to go to a social worker. The attorney relayed
this to the Judge prior to disposition and it prevented the boy from
being sent to an institution.
Finally, the attorney can interpret the disposition to the family and
help them to accept a proper disposition. To the parents, this could
mean a job well done by the attorney, since it was primarily he, who
helped secure the disposition. To the child it could prevent bitterness
and resentment because he "got a fair shake."
If a child is placed on probation, the attorney must encourage co-
operation from the parents and the child. The best example of what not
to do is where a child was placed on probation and, while a probation
officer was talking to the boy, his attorney (full of impatience) barked,
"Yeh, Yeh! Let the kid go already, he spent five days in the Detention
Home."
(Continued from preceding page)
rather on the child's needs if the money is available. Devereux for instance, is best
suited for children of above average intelligence who are suffering from emotional
disturbance. Boystown is generally available to economically deprived youths who
have gravitated towards delinquency as a result of their environment.
4s There are many such facilities available in the Cuyahoga County area, for which
there is no charge. Catholic Big Brothers is one of these, whereat "big brothers"
are assigned to fatherless boys who show signs of underdevelopment because of the
lack of a male person in their lives, with whom to identify. Jewish Big Brothers
also operate on the same principle, as does Protestant Big Brothers.
The Cuyahoga County Youth Service offers individual and group casework
counselling for young people between the ages of 12 and 21 with personal, social
and behavioral problems. The Mental Development Center of Case-Western Re-
serve University provides evaluation, parent guidance and counselling for children
who have problems of slow mental development.
This is by no means an exhaustive list, but perhaps from this an attorney
representing a child will become aware that everything is not "100%" when they
leave the courtroom. He can be the catalytic factor, resulting in further help and
guidance for his client.
Sept. 1969
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Conclusion
An attorney once commented that the effect of Gault was to place
him in his proper role, that of an advocate whose sole purpose was to
defend constitutional rights, and that he did not have to be a social
worker or psychologist. But the effect of Gault is to bring counsel into
the Juvenile Court,49 which is a court with compassion." Thus, being a
special court, it requires special skills,5 1 so that the client may not only
receive due process, but if needed, will receive proper care.
Even though getting involved with the Juvenile Court necessitates
the learning of new skills, it is well worth the extra effort. It will bring
you the respect and admiration of the Juvenile Court and the commu-
nity.
49 Does not the requirements of Gault that every child shall have the right to be
represented by counsel mean that more lawyers are going to be in Juvenile Court?
In a scholarly work, Professor B. George, Jr. of the University of Michigan School
of Law, suggests that the attorney will have less difficulty, adapting to the pro-
cedures required by Gault, than the court staff will. George, Gault and the Juvenile
Court Revolution, at 52 (Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1968).
50 Although it is felt that the Juvenile Court must have compassion because of the
innocence and naivet6 of juvenile offenders and the good possibility of rehabilitation
at their young age, Sheldon and Eleanor Gluick, in a study of delinquent youths,
suggested that there is very little evidence of what kind of rehabilitation programs
are successful. They emphasize that the basic reason for this is chronical matu-
ration, to wit, they get married, settle down etc. and that this pulls them out of the
street gang. Glick, Later Criminal Careers (Commonwealth fund, 1937)-.
Dr. Walter Reckless, noted authority on Criminology, also points out that the de-
linquents of today are not the criminals of tomorrow and that this presumption is
verified by many studies of adult male prison populations, which have indicated that
less than 50 percent of the adult prisoners were involved in any sort of delinquency.
Reckless, The Crime Problem. (Appleton-Century-Crafts, 1961.)
51 No doubt the attorney will confront more expert witnesses than in an ordinary
criminal hearing, in that much emphasis is .placed on the findings of the probation
officers, psychologists and psychiatrist.
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